Introduction
Despite being actively engaged in human rights at the international level, Australia has no federal Bill of Rights. How then does its international engagement translate into domestic application of human rights norms?
There are two parts to the answer. First, to date, the domestic invocation of international norms has been ad hoc. It has come through select executive, legislative and judicial initiatives. Those measures have drawn upon some international covenants to which Australia has become a party through executive actions in ratifying relevant covenants.
Legislation has given local effect to some of those covenants. There has also been development of the common law by the courts in applying some international human rights norms in cases decided by them. Notwithstanding this combined answer, there remains a lacuna. There is no single source to which courts, the legislature and the executive may turn for definitive guidance on questions of human rights with which they have to deal. In particular, there is no single repository of those international human rights norms that have domestic operation. A more comprehensive response is required. The missing ingredient, it would seem, is a federal Bill of Rights.
There are a various possibilities for a more complete domestic implementation of international covenants. These include the types of Bills of rights working in other jurisdictions. This includes countries whose jurisprudence is referred to in Australian courts in a variety of areas, namely the United States, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.
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The best known of these is the United States model: a Bill of Rights that has been constitutionally entrenched enumerating a broad set of rights enforceable in the courts.
Legislation that fails to comply with those rights is amenable to being judicially declared beyond power and invalid. Under this model, it is the courts which have the final say on the validity of any government action. Other models, such as those used in Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom differ in the varying supremacy that is given to the legislature over to the courts.
The Australian model of ad hoc implementation does have its advantages. The
Australian approach is laissez-faire. It requires the minimum of consensus among those who are affected by members of a federal polity concerning the implementation. This ad hoc approach also requires little or no constitutional development or reform.
But it has distinct limitations as a method for delivery of international human rights norms into the domestic sphere. The current Australian model is inadequate as an ultimate method for implementation for at least two reasons. First, the ad hoc approach leaves a 3 Australian courts frequently cite judicial authorities from the United States, Canada and New Zealand. It has also been traditional to refer to United Kingdom authorities. Examples of areas in which decisions of those jurisdictions are cited, to name but a few, where those foreign decisions have helped shape the relevant jurisprudence include tort (Perre v Apand (1999) Australia has ratified obligations for implementation that go beyond those that have been legislated to date. The current approach to implementation gives scant effect to the obligations to provide an effective remedy for violations with respect to rights contained in the covenant. 6 Additionally, leaving domestic courts without the guidance of comprehensive legislative repositories of international norms means that the development of the common law in the area of human rights will be uncertain, although potentially broad. The courts have shown uncertainty as to the extent to which human rights norms are able to inform the development of the common law.
Recently, the common law tradition proved equal to the task of protecting of international human rights norms in the domestic sphere: the celebrated decision of the United States 14 Allied to this is the need for an independent regulator that has roles of education and enforcement in the area of human rights. Australian experience with admirable fulfilment of that role by the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity
Commission demonstrates that the presence of such a regulator is critical to a serious endeavour to implement international human rights norms domestically. But a Bill of Rights of the kind described would complete the picture that is, at the moment, sketchy in form and in some respects lacking in substance. A robust approach seems to be called for if human rights are to be taken seriously.
Arguments against the implementation of a robust model do exist. First, there is the assertion that the common law adequately protects rights. Secondly, there is the argument that human rights are best left unarticulated, lest the words of the legislature enacting the Bill of Rights be given undesired outcomes when they come before the courts. Thirdly, it is advanced that if it is insisted that a Bill of Rights be entrenched, then there is the practical argument that the requisite constitutional amendment required to 12 That is, it should not be amenable to amendment or repeal by ordinary legislative process. 13 That is, standing should be conferred upon anyone affected by a breach to bring the matter to court for appropriate remedies. 14 And is in keeping with the tradition of enforcement of rights in the courts.
entrench can be difficult to achieve 15 . The High Court might be willing to apply the interpretative presumption that common law should be applied and that statutes should be interpreted consistently with international law wherever possible. Such an interpretative presumption, however, provides no substantive guarantee that the content of the Geneva Conventions would be given any effect. Even the status of customary international law in Australia is uncertain. But it is currently unlikely to be directly invoked in domestic courts.
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It is worth bearing this brief analysis in mind throughout the discussion of Australian law's approach to its international obligations. quick to ratify but reluctant to give domestic effect. The uncertainty of Australian law in this respect is obvious. It may lead to the conclusion that Australia, to use the vernacular, "talks the talk", but doesn't "walk the walk". International human rights norms in the Australian domestic context demand more comprehensive and substantive implementation.
Sources of International Human Rights Norms for Domestic Application within Australia
By "international law", we intend a number of normative structures governing The ratification of such international human rights instruments creates obligations to implement the relevant norms. The international legal obligation it has at least three levels: to respect, to protect and to fulfil. 39 The obligation to respect a right requires refraining from action which would inhibit its implementation. As such, it is an obligation which the Executive itself can fulfil. The obligation to protect is more positive in nature.
Real 
The Current Position in Australia
The federal Parliament is empowered by the Constitution to make laws "with respect to … external affairs".
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This external affairs power enables the federal legislature to implement by way of legislation international treaties and covenants, including those that contain human rights norms. • Right to due process in the sense of ensuring equality before the law; The lack of human rights protection in the Australian Constitution is not only a result of historical circumstances and a difficult amendment procedure. There was at the time of drafting much less of a trend towards entrenched rights than has been the experience over the last fifty years. At the end of the nineteenth century, only three models were available for a federal constitution: the United States, Switzerland and Canada. As mentioned, the Australian Constitution entrenches a procedure for constitutional amendment that has been found to be notoriously difficult. Section 128 requires a national referendum which must be passed by a majority of people as a whole and a majority of people in a majority of states. This latter requirement means that at least four out of six States within the federal system must pass the referendum.
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Experience highlights the difficulty of amending the constitution. 56 It also provides some explanation as to why those favouring a Bill of Rights are resigned to the fact that it is unlikely to be constitutionally entrenched to incorporate further human rights. However, given its importance to the durability of the protection of rights, discussions on mechanisms for entrenchment that are more politically feasible should not be foreclosed.
Protection of Human Rights within Australia's Ad Hoc Model of Implementation
The Recognising these current inadequacies, it is necessary to examine current mechanisms for implementing human rights protection. Such protections as exist under the ad hoc approach, fall short of implementing international law obligations.
Express Constitutional Rights
The inadequacy of the Australian Constitution's protection of rights arises from their negative expression as "prohibitions". They have thus attracted narrow construction.
Affirmative declarations of rights, as has become the pattern since the emergence of the United Nations, would possibly result in more strident protection.
The following three examples of express rights, namely, religious freedom, trial by jury and democratic and political rights, serve to demonstrate how the inadequacies of their expression, interpretation and dislocation from any a clearly expressed Bill of Rights have failed to promote those rights in Australia.
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1) Religious Freedom
Section 116 is one example of drafting that has attracted a narrow interpretation.
In the United States the right to freedom of religion is protected by the First Amendment. Section 116 of the Australian Constitution is similar in wording, but has been construed as a nineteenth century statute rather than as part of a Bill of Rights. Although the most direct adoption of an American constitutional provision in the Australian Constitution, it has been confined in its operation more than its American counterpart. provision which now has no significance.
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Apart from this historical purpose, the provision creates no individual rights.
Implied rights
If express rights, to the extent that they exist, are inadequately protected by the Australian Constitution, one might expect courts, in their interpretation of the Constitution, to find certain implied rights. This has sometimes been the case. Confusion flows from implying rights in the Constitution. Implied constitutional rights have had to 'borrow' from philosophical traditions not entirely consistent with the domestic situation. They overlap with common law doctrines in ways that are frequently difficult to comprehend. The doctrine of implied rights remains controversial and unsettled and the experience underlines a weakness. It is highly unlikely that the provisions of the Australian Constitution will be construed by the Courts in a manner that will enhance the ad hoc approach in a manner which will satisfy Australia's international obligations on human rights.
(2) "Legitimate expectations" as a mechanism for domestic delivery of international norms
One attempt at direct domestic delivery of international human rights norms was in the development of the doctrine of "legitimate expectation" in Australian law.
This judicial initiative again evidences the difficulties in common law courts protecting human rights without express constitutional mandate.
The doctrine holds that international conventions ratified by Australia but not legislated may nevertheless be given effect through the application of administrative law principles founding a legitimate expectation. the separation of powers, human rights are considered better expressed by the legislative branch Regardless, whether the sentiment against "judicial activism" on the part of unelected judges indirectly incorporating international human rights norms is well-founded or not, there is no discernable movement towards certainty. To date, the Australian people have appeared unwilling to give constitutional status to such rights through their legislature or the Constitution. 98 And the courts have not yet been definitive.
(3) Implied Common Law Rights
The common law remains the one hope for protecting individual rights. Yet, the extent to which a body of law developed incrementally from the "bottom-up" can implement a nation's international human rights obligations is questionable. • Qualified right to legal representation for a person charged with a serious offence;
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• Right to examine material evidence to be used against an accused;
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• Right of a criminal accused not to be charged more than once for the same offence; 107 • Right of a criminal accused not to be compelled to testify or speak to police; 108 • Right of a criminal accused to have the jury in a criminal tried warned against reliance on uncorroborated police evidence of a confessional statement;
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• Right for administrative decisions to be made according to procedural fairness One positive development and significant use of Australian common law to create rights has been the recognition of native title claims. 113 Described as a 'break-through', it is one concrete example of the common law developing conformably with international law. 114 In the seminal native title case, Mabo v Queensland (No 2) the Court expressly referred to Australia's international obligations as a pattern for conformity:
'The opening up of international remedies to individuals pursuant to Australia's accession to the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights brings to bear on the common law the powerful influence of the Covenant and the international standards it imports. The common law does not necessarily conform with international law, but international law is a legitimate and important influence on the development of common law, especially when international law declares the existence of universal human rights' 115
As unpredictable as the occasions may be, Mabo was one instance in which judges were willing to respond to international human rights norms as inspiration when developing common law. 116 But, as the Jago case illustrates, it must be emphasised, such development of common law in this manner has not been consistent.
(4) Statutory Interpretation
Another example of positive development of the common law to correspond with international norms is in the interpretation of statutes. Australia's treaty obligations have been used as a tool of statutory interpretation. As far as language allows, a statute may be read consistently with Australia's obligations under international treaties. 118 It is not yet clear whether this applies only to statutes that actually purport to implement Australia's international obligations.
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It is also unclear if all provisions of international treaties will be called in aid of statutory construction or whether some provisions will be considered merely aspirational and not used. 120 This use of international law in statutory interpretation fits appropriately within recognised methods of judicial decision-making. 121 However, statutory interpretation cannot represent any significant attempt at implementation of Australia's international obligations. It remains a tool that will be used when ambiguity in the statute requires it.
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In any event, advancement in the common law's use of international human rights norms can be abrogated by Parliament. This may require clear and unambiguous language. 123 The express words used to abrogate a common law right should evidence that Parliament specifically considered the question of whether or not to abrogate the relevant right. 124 The development of Australian law under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
demonstrates the ease with which Parliament can achieve the abrogation of common law rights. The right to procedural fairness in the making of administrative decisions has been expressly removed by sections 51A, 97A, 118A, 127A, 357A, 422B of the Act. These provisions replace common law natural justice with a more limited statutory scheme which is to be a comprehensive statement of procedural fairness requirements under the Act.
The legislative history highlights the uncertainty of relying on the common law to protect rights. When the Migration Act was first enacted, it contained what was said to be a comprehensive code of 'procedures for dealing fairly, efficiently and quickly with visa applications'. The intention of the legislation was to replace common law rules of natural justice. Indeed, the explanatory memoranda of the Bill said as much. 125 The High Court nevertheless applied a traditional common law approach. 126 The legislative text could not override the common law without clear expression of that intention. In response, Parliament enacted the provisions mentioned above, which expressly state that the relevant statutory division is an exhaustive statement of the requirements of natural justice. Again, this demonstrates that the common law must always remain an incomplete system of rights protection, subservient to the legislative will, whatever that might be.
Even assuming willingness in the common law courts to recognise human rights, those rights are difficult to assemble comprehensively. An attempt has been made in the form of the Banagalore Principles of 1988. 127 They are principles recognised in most common law countries, where international law is not enforceable unless incorporated domestically:
'It is within the proper nature of the judicial process and well-established judicial functions for national courts to have regard to international obligations which a country undertakes … for the purpose of removing ambiguity or uncertainty from national constitutions, legislation or common law'
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The principles have been adopted in some of the Australian judicial decisions discussed above. The statement recognises a role for international law in the development of the common and domestic law without usurping the role of the legislature. International law is not 'part of' domestic law. This exclusion may be a Without commenting on the effectiveness of the anti-vilification legislation as a vehicle for delivery of religious freedom, or upon its impact on freedom of speech, it does seem ironic that the delivery of any freedom, that is internationally recognised, should depend upon which side of a country's internal state borders one finds oneself. This irony bespeaks the need for a national approach to the implementation of rights.
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission
The most extensive domestic legislative implementation of human rights obligations is to As can be seen, the creation of the federal Human Rights and Equal Opportunity
Commission one of the most concrete legislative and administrative steps Australia has taken. 151 The duty of the Commission is to oversee the implementation of the various Commonwealth discrimination statutes. Its brief includes inquiring into or conciliating complaints of unlawful discrimination, dealing with complaints lodged, examining enactments or practices for consistency with human rights, promoting public understanding of human rights and conducting research and educational programmes and providing advice as to the steps required to ensure Australian conformity with our international obligations.
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The Commission has proven itself effective. It has interpreted its own role liberally including investigation of complaints of breach of international instruments by the Commonwealth and advising Parliament where legislation should be amended to comply with human rights norms. 153 In the absence of meaningful constitutional protection, comprehensive legislation and consistency in judicial decisions, the Commission is a most robust instrument for protecting human rights. It provides systematic and consistent review of Australia's position vis-à-vis its human rights obligations. That the Commission has approached its task with zeal is evidenced by the fact that there has been rarely an issue on which Australia has been criticised by an international treaty committee that the Commission had not previously brought to the attention of the Australian government. 154 The Commission fulfils the vital role of human rights education. A human rights culture is imperative for full protection of human rights. Such a belief is reflected in the preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 155 Arguably, in a nation like Australia which has proven reticent to the implementation of a Bill of Rights, such education is of special significance. This is part of the vital role of the Commission.
The Commission has been prolific in publications, media releases and maintaining of internet materials on human rights. The public debate and scrutiny which would accompany the adoption of a Bill of Rights would be the ably assisted by the Commission. In the meantime, the Commission fulfils an important role in education as to human rights 156 and giving a limited set of remedies for contravention of the Acts it administers.
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A Bill of Rights for Australia: Towards a More Comprehensive Implementation
The obvious method to remedy the inadequacies of the ad hoc approach is through a Apart from the limited remedial powers of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, little can be said to provide an effective remedy for violations with respect to rights contained in the Covenant. There are also questions, outside the work of the Commission, as to the overall efficacy of efforts put forward to satisfy the human normative obligations to respect, to protect and to fulfil.
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As mentioned, the model proposed been only combine a constitutional referral of powers with the agreement to a co-operative legislative scheme by each Australian government if there were some norm that was not capable of being embraced by a federal exercise of legislative power under the external affairs power If we assume the existence of that will at some stage in the future, a Bill of Rights could be implemented that would have greater status than ordinary law. It would make possible a relatively well entrenched Bill that could provide ordinary citizens direct access to courts for remedies. It would not only better fulfil international obligations, but also be consistent with the tradition of judicial reviews of legislative and executive acts that forms part of Australian law.
Conclusion
International human rights treaties and norms are an essential part of the global legal and political landscape. Their efficacy depends on the willingness of state parties to undertake domestic implementation. As a State that is committed to human rights,
Australia has yet to definitively demonstrate its commitment to domestic implementation so as to adequately supplement the operation of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission. A Bill of Rights is a critical step towards showing that it does 'respect fully human rights standards, especially those of the Covenant, which have been developed as statements of the ideal at international level, and ensure that they are given a primary role in the reform and development of national law'.
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A co-operative legislative model avoids the need for constitutional amendment in order to achieve entrenchment. By means of intergovernmental checks and balances, it provides entrenchment, protecting against any individual government's political whim and ill considered repeal or abrogation. It creates national uniformity. It would bring Australia in line with the rest of its common law cousins. Lastly, but not least, it will demonstrate that Australia takes its international rights obligations seriously.
And if such a Bill were to become part of the domestic law, it may just give a detainee at a military facility, a refugee, or a member of a religious or ethnic minority some hope of a fair procedural outcome before an Australian court and security of rights under domestically implemented human rights norms.
